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THE LAW OF WILDLIFE 
PROTECTION IN THE 
UNITED STATES
David H. Getches*
Wildlife management law in the United States has re­
sponded to maturing social values and developing biological 
knowledge about fish and wildlife. These influences are re­
flected in several historical trends. The early democratization 
of wildlife harvesting opportunities marked a repudiation of 
English common law principles that had reserved wildlife for 
the amusement of the elite. Free access to wildlife was subse­
quently tempered by popularly supported first federal and then 
state legislation to curtail the demonstrated excesses of com­
mercial harvesting. This, in turn, led to widespread state re­
striction and licensing of public hunting and fishing. State 
agencies charged with carrying out these laws had to provide 
hunting and fishing opportunities to as many people as possi­
ble while preventing species extinction. As agencies became 
more knowledgeable about species, their habitats and needs, 
the central mission of state government became the biologi­
cally sound management of wildlife populations. The federal 
government has taken the lead in recent years in the protec­
tion of particular species that have been endangered by com­
mercial activity, past mismanagement and loss of habitat.
The history of American wildlife management has been 
characterized by tensions between the federal and state gov­
ernments. Functions have been split between the two 
sovereigns, with the states concentrating their management on 
species that are hunted and fished. Although the federal gov­
ernment entered the arena of wildlife management to deal with 
interstate and international problems, primarily related to 
commerce, its influence has permeated nearly all aspects of 
wildlife management through the setting of important na­
tional limitations and requirements. The federal role has ex­
panded to include concerns for endangered species that are of­
ten neglected by state laws and to promote more comprehen­
sive scientific^ management of all wildlife resources. Federal 
power is exercised through federal public land use planning, 
financial incentives to states and specific prohibitions that 
supersede or drive state law.
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
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Today, the force of biological knowledge and public con­
cern supports comprehensive management and protection of 
all species and the preservation of their habitat. Legal institu­
tions have been slow to respond, however, due to economic 
concerns and other problems. Because modem wildlife man­
agement demands habitat protection for a wide variety of 
species, legal action is expensive. Greater public expenditures 
and trade-offs with economic development make legal change 
politically difficult. Yet the stakes are greater now than ever 
before: habitat is shrinking under the press of development 
while a growing population appreciates increasingly diverse 
and deeply held values in wildlife.
HISTORY
Wildlife protection law in the United States has roots in 
old English law. The original colonies in North America were 
subjected to the English common law, and many states and the 
federal government assimilated these laws and legal concepts 
in their constitutions and statutes. Although the early 
colonists retained the common law in most other areas, they 
repudiated many aspects of English wildlife law.
Under English law the sovereign— the King or Queen— was 
deemed to have all the legal rights to wildlife. No one owned 
wild animals or fish until they were captured or killed. The 
King or Queen granted hunting and fishing rights, typically fa­
voring wealthy classes with special privileges. English  
"qualification statutes" required that one have a certain 
amount of money or land to have the privilege to hunt; com­
mon people were flatly prohibited from hunting or even eating 
wildlife. The laws also prohibited those not qualified to hunt 
from owning weapons used in hunting. Commoners who 
farmed and grazed small parcels of land were required to toler­
ate the activities of those who held hunting rights on the same 
land. Because hunting was then essentially an amusement, the 
restrictions on hunting under English law were designed, like 
rules in a game, to maintain the challenge of the sport.1
The American colonists rebelled against the application 
of English wildlife laws; indeed, they viewed many of the laws 
as contrary to the democratic principles that underlay the 
United States Constitution. Americans believed that all citi­
zens have a common right to the abundant wildlife resource. 
They considered hunting an economic right or necessity, not 
simply a sport for the aristocracy. To facilitate public hunting 
rights, some early colonial laws prohibited owners of unen­
closed lands from preventing others from taking wildlife on 
their lands. Further, the second amendment to the United 
States Constitution,2 ensuring all citizens the right to keep and
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bear arms, was partly a reaction to the ban on hunting 
weapons in English law.
The American idea that everyone should be able to hunt 
led to serious depletions of some wildlife species. In fact, elim­
ination of some wild animals was encouraged to help tame the 
wilderness and make areas suitable for agriculture. When 
wildlife populations began to decline, however, some states 
and local governments passed laws to protect wild animals. As 
early as 1646, the town of Portsmouth, Rhode Island enacted 
laws prohibiting deer hunting during certain seasons of the 
year. Later, states limited the number of animals that could be 
killed by a hunter. In 1878 Maine restricted hunters to three 
deer per year. Iowa set a daily bag limit of twenty-five prairie 
chickens per hunter.3
States were challenged to deal with a conflict between a 
growing exploitation of wildlife for profit and the principle 
that wildlife species should be protected in order to furnish a 
food supply for citizens who needed it and wanted to hunt. Be­
cause state legislatures were reluctant to limit public rights to 
hunt and fish, commercial hunters were able to take large 
numbers of wildlife, endangering the survival of certain 
species and depleting the numbers of animals available to 
hunters seeking food.4
The fur trade was an important influence in America’s 
economic and social history. Some cities, like New York, were 
settled in their present locations partly for convenience in re­
ceiving and shipping furs in the lucrative international fur 
trade. Trappers reaped large fortunes by the uncontrolled har­
vest of wild animals for their pelts. As beaver populations 
rapidly declined in New England because of intensive trapping, 
fur trappers moved westward across the continent. In fact, 
when President Thomas Jefferson commissioned the Lewis & 
Clark Expedition, which forged a trail across the country and 
helped open up the West for settlement, he was motivated in 
part by reports of large numbers of English trappers moving 
into the area. Jefferson sought to assert American control over 
western wildlife resources. Fortunately for the beaver, the 
market for beaver hats suddenly declined around 1830. At that 
point, beaver were nearly extinct and probably would have 
been exterminated altogether if styles had not changed.5
Hunters zealously harvested birds and animals to supply 
markets with wildlife commodities ranging from meat to any 
kind of feathers that could adorn hats. As a result, the passen­
ger pigeon, the most populous species of American bird in the 
mid-1800s, was rendered extinct by 1900. Bison roaming the 
Great Plains of the American West numbered 60 million ani­
mals in the mid-1800s, but were reduced to insignificance by
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1880. Millions were killed for their tongues, considered a deli­
cacy in the East. The United States government actually en­
couraged the extermination of the bison because it would lead 
to easier subjugation of American Indians on the plains (whose 
subsistence depended on the beasts) and the more orderly set­
tlement of the West by non-Indians. In response to concern 
over the potential extinction of the bison and outrage ex­
pressed by many American citizens, Congress passed a bison 
protection bill in 1874. President Grant vetoed the bill, how­
ever, and the population of the animals dwindled.6
In the late nineteenth century, following a period of fed­
eral and state inattention to wildlife protection, states finally 
began to enforce existing laws to preserve breeding stocks of 
wildlife species to maintain food supplies. Because state re­
strictions were uneven, however, wildlife protection was frus­
trated by violators who crossed state lines. If one state prohib­
ited marketing wildlife goods, illegally killed wildlife could be 
transported to a state that had no restrictions.7
Public concern for wildlife protection was first aroused 
among sport hunters, who were typically rich patrons of 
lodges. They clashed with market hunters seeking profits from 
the sale of wildlife goods. The sport hunters often used their 
political influence to pressure state governments to enact 
protective laws. Though their individual influence was  
significant, affluent hunters were few in number. But sport 
hunting became more popular as the frontier closed and 
Americans had more leisure time. The greater numbers of 
people who were attracted to hunting and fishing organized 
politically active clubs, and successfully urged enactment of 
state laws to protect wildlife. For example, the New York 
Sportsmen's Club, founded in 1844, drafted a model game law  
that was adopted in a few counties. When local governments 
were reluctant to enforce the laws, the club sued violators. Such 
groups also influenced legislatures and brought the discussion 
of wildlife protection to the attention of the American  
citizenry. They used the news media to educate the public about 
the benefits of legislation limiting hunting, especially 
commercial wildlife exploitation.8
It seems ironic that sport hunters would lead the way to a 
popular movement for wildlife protection. The initial dearth 
of regulation in America was traceable to the colonists' reject­
ing English law that benefited only an elite class of sportsmen. 
The underlying notion—that wildlife was a resource open to 
uncontrolled public use—facilitated the market hunters' 
abuses. Yet it was sportsmen’s groups who ultimately con­
vinced the public and the politicians of the need for regulation. 
Wide expanses of federal public lands in the West open to hunt­
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ing for all, and the potential access to wildlife by large num­
bers of Americans (if it could be saved from the exploitation of 
market hunters) may have helped to convince citizens and 
politicians that the sportsmen's cause was not simply for the 
benefit of the few who had access to special hunting preserves.
As hunting and fishing became more popular in the twen­
tieth century, the political influence of sportsmen grew. The 
demand for outdoor recreation in the United States accelerated 
after World War II as the average American enjoyed greater 
wealth and leisure. Between 1955 and 1980, the number of 
hunters grew more than 41 percent while the number of sport 
fishermen more than doubled.9 Wildlife protection was also 
demanded by other constituencies, not just sportsmen.10 
Wildlife "uses" expanded to include photography, bird 
watching, and other nonconsumptive activities. A  recent study 
shows that about half of all Americans participate in some 
nonconsumptive recreational wildlife use. 11
The political importance of wildlife has been closely re­
lated to the economic impact of wildlife uses, primarily sport 
hunting and fishing. Major commercial activity is now con­
centrated in the ocean and estuarine fisheries of New England 
and the Pacific Northwest.12 Fur trapping continues in some 
places, but only on a small scale. Thus, the greatest economic 
effect of wildlife use is the multi-billion dollar contribution to 
national, state and local economies by hunters and fishermen 
who buy licenses, equipment, and related goods and services.13 
These expenditures have given sportsmen a voice in political 
decisions. Although nonconsumptive wildlife users are more 
numerous and widespread, they have less political influence 
than sportsmen because of their varied interests and lack of 
concentrated economic power.
Although politicians have reacted primarily to the 
demonstrable economic values of wildlife, they are beginning 
to understand, if not act upon, a wider range of values. Beyond 
the palpable value to science of being able to study ecosystems 
in natural laboratories and relate the results to human Sur­
vival, wildlife species also provide deeply-felt intangible bene­
fits.14 Those benefits include the ideas, experiences and under­
standing that we gain from observing wildlife. Families enjoy 
new cohesiveness and friends cement lasting bonds from their 
shared moments of seeing and hearing wildlife. People draw 
satisfaction from viewing wildlife or simply knowing that 
species can still thrive in the wild in the midst of a technologi­
cally complex world. Wildlife reminds us of our mortality and 
that humans, like other creatures, are all part of natural cycles 
and processes. Ultimately, this understanding may be an an­
chor for human survival. These intangible benefits from
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wildlife, with their historical, psychological, philosophical, 
aesthetic, intellectual and spiritual dimensions, are being re­
alized by more people. But the law has just begun to reflect 
these values.
STATE WILDLIFE PROTECTION
States have undertaken most of the wildlife regulation in 
the United States. American law embodies the idea that the 
states hold wildlife as a public trust for all the people. Under 
the Constitution, states theoretically assumed the sovereign 
position of the King or Queen that existed under English law. 
From the beginning the trust was considered to be for the pub­
lic benefit, not to be disbursed to favored classes as patronage. 
In 1842, the United States Supreme Court in Martin v. Wad­
dell15 upheld the right of states to restrict the commercial har­
vesting of wildlife in order to protect a food source for the peo­
ple. A  subsequent case, Geer v. Connecticut16, explained state 
power over wildlife as being based on a state ownership inter­
est. Regulatory authority of the state, as owner of wildlife, was 
rarely questioned. More recently, as state laws have come into 
conflict with federal interests in interstate commerce and in 
protecting wildlife as discussed below, the Supreme Court has 
repudiated the ownership doctrine and has recognized limits 
on state authority.17
State wildlife protection programs are varied, but all em­
phasize harvest regulation. Restrictions include prohibitions 
on commercialization, limits on hunting and fishing seasons, 
limits on the numbers of animals or fish that may be killed 
and requirements that any wildlife taken may not be wasted.18
Harvesting restrictions typically are carried out by re­
quiring hunters and fishermen to purchase annual licenses 
from a state agency. Early licensing systems did not limit the 
number of hunters, but were means of controlling hunter 
activity and raising revenue through license fees. More re­
cently, licensing has been used to achieve biological goals by 
permitting harvests based on timing, location and intensity of 
pressure on specific wildlife populations. States remain inter­
ested in hunting and fishing licensing because of the revenues 
that are raised; hunting and fishing license fees are typically a 
very large source of funds for state wildlife management agen­
cies.19
Enforcement of the early hunting and fishing restrictions 
and licensing laws was weak. Although most states had fish 
and game agencies by the mid-1800s, they lacked enforcement 
personnel. All states now have such employees, constituting a 
special police force, often with training in wildlife biology, to 
enforce wildlife protection laws.20
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State wildlife management today typically includes fish 
and wildlife stocking programs. Some programs have at­
tempted to reintroduce native species into areas where they 
have been exterminated or seriously diminished. Other pro­
grams have introduced animals and fish into areas where they 
did not formerly live. Fish stocking is used extensively to pro­
vide greater fishing opportunities for both sportsmen and 
commercial fishermen.21
Habitat management and acquisition are the most signif­
icant state wildlife programs. A  large proportion of agency 
budgets is spent on improving and maintaining habitats, such 
as rehabilitating streams and wetlands. States also purchase 
land and water areas to protect animals from the impacts of 
growth, development and overuse.22 Most acquired areas are 
valuable habitat where game species can be perpetuated and 
conserved to expand future hunting opportunities; some lands 
are acquired primarily to furnish public access to wildlife re­
sources for hunting and fishing. In many cases less than a fee 
simple interest may be acquired at lower cost and with benefits 
to the original owner.23 Thus, a state wildlife agency might ac­
quire an easement or other interest in a riparian area to assure 
that fish habitat is protected and that the public has access to 
fish. Yet the landowner can maintain ownership and certain 
rights necessary to use the land for other purposes (e.g., farm­
ing) that may be compatible with the easement. Several pri­
vate, nonprofit entities now assist public agencies and private 
landowners in conceiving and executing these schemes.24
Research efforts have tremendously enhanced the ability 
of states to regulate and manage wildlife. Every state wildlife 
management agency now has a research component staffed by 
highly qualified scientists who study animal diseases, migra­
tion patterns and habitat needs.25 Such programs provide data 
on populations of mammals, birds and fish that enable the 
agencies to set more precise regulations and to develop more 
effective and well-conceived habitat acquisition plans. In most 
states research programs are largely funded by the federal 
government.26
State planning allows agencies to anticipate their long­
term needs and demands and to develop programs to meet 
those needs in the future. A  majority of states now have long- 
range management plans. Some actively assist federal agen­
cies in planning for the use of the extensive public lands in the 
western United States.27
Almost every state now has a non-game program, empha­
sizing protection and management of species that are not har­
vested.28 These programs, however, usually pale in size and 
scope next to programs for management of game species. A l­
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though there is great public interest in non-game programs, 
they suffer from a lack of funding. A  heavy reliance on hunting 
and fishing license fees skews state wildlife programs towards 
perpetuation of game species and improving harvesting oppor­
tunities. Although potential sources of funding for non-game 
wildlife are severely limited, state legislatures have been  
reluctant to appropriate general state tax revenues to wildlife 
management agencies for any purposes. This is one result of 
the agencies’ success in being largely self-supporting from li­
cense fees for management activities related to hunting and 
fishing.29 One special source of revenue for non-game wildlife 
that has been adopted in a number of states is a voluntary 
"check-off' on state income tax returns that allows taxpayers 
to contribute money for non-game management. 30
FEDERAL WILDLIFE PROTECTION LAWS
Historically, the federal government has chosen to respect 
a primary state interest in managing wildlife resources. In re­
cent years, however, Congress has asserted much greater regu­
latory and management authority over wildlife. Federal regu­
lation first responded to commercial wildlife trade. Now fed­
eral financial assistance also guides and shapes state pro­
grams, and wildlife management has become part of planning 
and management of the federal public lands (national forests, 
Bureau of Land Management lands, national parks, etc.).31 
Several federal laws also protect particular species of fish and 
wildlife on private as well as public lands. 32
In the federal system, the initial issue is whether the na­
tional government has power to regulate wildlife resources. 
The United States Congress may only exercise powers specifi­
cally granted to it under the Constitution. All powers not 
specifically given to Congress are reserved to the states.33 A l­
though the United States government traditionally has de­
ferred to the states’ sovereign interest in wildlife, there are sev­
eral federal interests that have properly involved the federal 
government in wildlife protection: interstate commerce, 
treaties, and public land management.
The federal government's actions to protect wildlife popu­
lations from exploitation by commercial hunters were rooted 
in Congress’s interstate commerce power. The market hunting 
problem was difficult for the states to control themselves be­
cause illegally taken wildlife could be removed to another state 
where it was legal, rendering prohibitions against commer­
cialization in the first state ineffective. Congress properly en­
acted comprehensive legislation because, under the Constitu­
tion, it has the exclusive authority to regulate interstate com­
merce.34 The Lacey Act35 made it a federal crime to transport
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wildlife killed in violation of the law of one state into another 
state, effectively ending market hunting.
Early in the twentieth century, the United States entered 
into treaties for the protection of several wildlife species. In 
1911 a treaty was executed with Russia and Japan for protec­
tion of the northern fur seal.36 Other treaties have been negoti­
ated with foreign nations to protect commercial fisheries,37 
whales,38 marine mammals39 and endangered species.40 They 
have been implemented through several federal statutes. When 
the Congress passed the Migratory Bird Act of 1913,41 the legis­
lation was ruled unconstitutional as exceeding the authority of 
Congress.42 But a few years later, after the Migratory Bird 
Treaty43 was signed with Great Britain to protect migratory 
birds in the United States and Canada, Congress enacted a law 
that controls virtually all aspects of hunting ducks and other 
migratory birds.44 The Supreme Court upheld the Migratory 
Bird Treaty Act as a proper exercise of congressional power to 
enter into and carry out treaties under the United States Con­
stitution.45 Other federal laws have been enacted to carry out 
the agreements and provisions in wildlife-related treaties. For 
example, the Marine Mammal Protection Act declares a mora­
torium on taking all marine mammals, regardless of state 
laws to the contrary. 46
For many years there was uncertain and uneven state reg­
ulation of ocean fisheries. This has been clarified by a federal 
law, the Fishery and Conservation Management Act,47 that 
leaves regulation of fish and wildlife within a three-mile off­
shore area to the states. The United States, however, asserted 
sovereignty as against that of other nations fishing within its 
territorial waters and preempted any inconsistent state 
regulation within 200 miles of the shores of the United States. 
Thus, the law established a 197-mile federal fishery conserva­
tion zone within which the United States has exclusive man­
agement authority over all marine life other than marine 
mammals, birds and highly migratory species. The law deals 
specially with anadromous fish that spawn in its fresh or estu­
ary waters for which foreign fishing had become quite compet­
itive and, in some cases, destructive. State officials participate 
with federal officials on regional councils in formulating 
comprehensive management plans for the species covered by 
the Act. ■
Perhaps the most pervasive form of federal wildlife man­
agement is through the statutes that require federal agencies to 
protect and manage wildlife resources on federal public 
lands.48 About one-third of the total land area of the United 
States is owned by the federal government. The public lands 
are generally the least developed and the most important habi­
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tat for fish and wild animals. Land management statutes re­
quire the federal agencies to consider wildlife and recreation 
interests when they plan for and manage the public lands.49 
This has interjected a requirement that federal agencies con­
sider wildlife management regulation in the plans they de­
velop for national forests50 and Bureau of Land Management 
lands.51 Federal land management laws include language def­
erential to the authority of the states to manage wildlife, but 
the role of the land management agencies in preserving habitat 
is so extensive that it often has tremendous impacts on the way 
the states can manage species. The Constitution gives Congress 
authority to make all needful rules and regulations for the 
management of its property.52 This power is far-reaching and 
has even been interpreted by the Supreme Court as allowing 
federal regulation of deer harvesting in a national forest. 53
Sometimes federal laws come into direct conflict with 
state wildlife management laws. For example, in 1971 
Congress passed a law protecting wild free-roaming horses and 
burros.54The protected beasts are descendants of animals that 
escaped or were abandoned by early western settlers and min­
eral prospectors. They are generally not protected by state 
wildlife laws and, indeed, are considered nuisances under 
many state laws because they interfere with livestock grazing. 
Yet the Supreme Court held that wild horses and burros are 
protected by federal law.55 This protection would extend to the 
animals even when they are off federal lands, because they are 
essentially part of the federal public lands and therefore are 
covered by Congress’ property power.
Endangered species protection involves pervasive federal 
controls. The federal power to regulate activities that interfere 
with endangered species is based on the commerce clause56 and 
the treaty-making power57 in the United States Constitution. 
Federal action is necessary where species cross state lines. It 
also may be desirable when endangered species’ habitat is in a 
jurisdiction where there is no constituency for its preserva­
tion. For example, the endangered timber wolf is considered a 
threat to livestock in Minnesota.58 Furthermore, state wildlife 
agencies are heavily dependent upon income from hunting and 
fishing licenses and thus tend to be less enthusiastic about en­
dangered species programs, which usually lack adequate fund­
ing.
The Endangered Species Act59 is probably the most potent 
federal wildlife law. It requires that the Secretary of the De­
partment of Interior establish a list of species, sub-species or 
distinct populations that are endangered or threatened with 
extinction. The Act also provides for the listing of geographic 
areas ("critical habitats") considered essential to the conserva-
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tion of a listed species. Species listed as endangered and their 
critical habitats are protected by stringent regulations. The 
Act's basic purpose of species "conservation" is broadly defined 
to mean the use of all methods necessary to bring a listed 
species to the point at which the protections provided by the 
Act are no longer necessary. In addition to the general mandate 
to "conserve" endangered and threatened species, the Act con­
tains a number of more specific requirements controlling im­
portation, commercialization and possession of such species, 
subject to criminal penalties. Section 9 of the Act60 prohibits 
"taking" by anyone (with a few limited exceptions) of any listed 
species. The most comprehensive protection is afforded by 
§ 7,61 which commands all federal agencies to ensure that their 
actions will not jeopardize the continued existence of a listed 
species or adversely modify its critical habitat.
The force of the Endangered Species Act was demonstrated 
in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,62 in which the Supreme 
Court upheld a challenge to a nearly completed federal dam on 
the grounds that it would—if completed—jeopardize a newly 
discovered endangered species of fish, the snail darter.
Federal involvement in the area of wildlife management 
goes beyond the exertion of regulatory power. Selective finan­
cial support for federally-funded programs has dramatically 
influenced state wildlife law. Several federal programs provide 
money to states to help them manage and regulate their fish 
and wildlife resources. The two most generous programs dis­
tribute funds collected from excise taxes on the sale of hunting 
equipment (firearms and ammunition) and fishing equipment 
to states, based on their geographic size and on the respective 
numbers of hunters and fishermen in each state.63 The funds 
are channeled primarily to management programs for species 
that are hunted and fished. By defining the types of funded pro­
grams that are eligible for assistance, the federal government 
has guided many aspects of state wildlife management.
Under the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act of 1980,64 
the federal government is authorized to give funds to states for 
planning that will result in comprehensive management of all 
wildlife species. This Act is intended to ameliorate the empha­
sis placed on game species as a result of license fee funding of 
state agencies. Unfortunately, the Act has not been funded, so 
the intended benefits are not being realized.
Habitat acquisition—purchase of rights to lands and wa­
ters needed for wildlife— is an important federal activity. The 
first federal habitat acquisition was in 1903 when President 
Theodore Roosevelt ordered creation of the Pelican Island Bird 
Refuge to protect egrets and herons that were being hunted to 
supply the taste for feathered hats. Congress then began desig­
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nating wildlife refuges and has since established an extensive 
national wildlife refuge system of hundreds of areas compris­
ing 85 million acres.65 Development activities that would re­
strict or damage wildlife habitat are prohibited in refuges. 
These areas protect a wide variety of species, although much of 
the land acquisition funding comes from a special federal 
stamp tax on waterfowl hunting licenses.66 Public hunting is 
allowed in many refuges where it would not contradict the 
needs of wildlife. The United States may enter into agreements 
with private landowners to acquire interests in their land for 
the protection of wildlife habitat. Federal funding is also used 
for state habitat acquisition.
Research and scientific information, made possible by 
and through the federal government, have similarly enabled 
better and different wildlife management. Federal technical 
assistance is selectively provided in areas of particular federal 
concern. Other, subtler federal influences have also been ap­
parent. For instance, the United States Forest Service 
commissioned Aldo Leopold to study the wildlife management 
problems such as overgrazing. In response, Leopold developed 
wildlife management methods that were dependent upon habi­
tat manipulation. Leopold’s book, Game Management,67 b e ­
came the primary text used for many years in training wildlife 
biologists. This contributed to the development of a corps of 
professional wildlife managers, rather than officials who 
simply enforce prohibitions or regulations. Leopold's influ­
ence on wildlife managers as students and consequently his 
influence on wildlife management as a science, has been sig­
nificant.
Some federal laws insist that environmental information 
and data be assembled and considered before making govern­
ment decisions. The National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) ,68 requiring an assessment of all the environmental ef­
fects of any proposed federal action, has helped produce data 
about wildlife species and their habitats. The Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act passed in 1934,69 specifies that equal consid­
eration is to be given to fish and wildlife values in making wa­
ter development decisions. It requires federal agencies to con­
sult with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and state wildlife 
agencies before federal agencies decide to dam, develop or con­
trol any stream. The Act has been eclipsed in importance by 
NEPA, however, as courts have held that compliance with 
NEPA is sufficient to satisfy both statutes.70
NEPA is particularly well-suited to identifying wildlife- 
related issues connected with major federal activities and pro­
jects having a significant environmental impact. It adopts an 
ecosystems approach to natural resources management and
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requires public participation in fact gathering and decision­
making. Interest groups and members of the public who, prior 
to the Act, had little voice in management decisions are now a 
necessary part of the process. This is especially important for 
groups and individuals that do not represent hunting and fish­
ing constituencies.71
The most pervasive regulation of development activities 
that may affect riparian habitat is under § 404 of the federal 
Clean Water Act.72 The Act is a comprehensive water pollution 
control program administered by the Environmental Protec­
tion Agency, but § 404 is an aberration. It requires that a fed­
eral permit be obtained from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
for "discharges of dredged or fill materials into the navigable 
waters." The § 404 program expanded on a late nineteenth cen­
tury regulatory program for controlling obstructions to navi­
gation.73 "Navigable waters" are now defined to include even 
wetlands and the areas adjacent to them74 where the histori­
cally paramount concern of the Corps of Engineers with navi­
gation and flood control is usually not present. "Discharges" 
include almost any construction project— dams, buildings, or 
bridges— and alterations such as clearing vegetation, moving 
earth, and drainage. Traditionally such matters of local land 
use and water development were left to local law.75
Neither its navigation-related history nor the pollution 
control context of the Clean Water Act have constrained the 
interpretation and application of § 404. Once federal jurisdic­
tion applies, a project is subject to broad environmental re­
view. If there is a "practicable" alternative that is less harmful 
to aquatic life than the proposed project, the Corps is supposed 
to deny the permit.76 Furthermore, the permit review process 
opens the project to scrutiny under the policies of federal and 
state laws that would not apply directly.77 The Corps is to seek 
comments from the Fish and Wildlife Service and incorporate 
them in its decision. One sweeping provision of the Corps regu­
lations requires a finding that the permit would be "in the pub­
lic interest," implicating far-ranging balancing of benefits 
against detriments of the proposed project.78 And if the permit 
is granted by the Corps, the EPA can override the decision.79 No 
other federal law insinuates environmental considerations so 
thoroughly into private development decisions and activities.
^  CONCLUSION
In the early days of the nation, wildlife protection in the 
United States was consciously limited to allow broad public 
access to fish and game. State and federal regulatory programs 
gained support as the public realized that controls, especially 
on commercial harvests, were necessary to prevent destruction
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of wildlife resources. Thus, modern wildlife laws and m an­
agement programs do not repudiate the democratic ideal of 
popular access to wild fish, birds and mammals; rather they 
reflect a more sophisticated sense of the importance of 
preserving a diversity of wildlife and their ambiance.
The federali government's historical deference to the states 
in wildlife management matters has given way to a growing 
body of federal regulation. Beginning at the turn of the century, 
Congress enacted a few laws asserting direct control over 
wildlife to which state law was subordinated. In the past 
twenty years the national government's role in wildlife man­
agement has grown dramatically in response to broader values 
than were reflected in state laws, curtailing the once plenary 
authority of the states. Intensified federal agency management 
of the public lands and their wildlife resources also has en­
croached upon state resource management autonomy. Federal 
action has generally reflected evolving public attitudes toward 
wildlife protection and improved scientific knowledge; state 
responses are more restrained by local political concerns. Fed­
eral leadership continues today through regulatory require­
ments that prevent or mitigate habitat damage caused by 
pollution and encroachment of development and through 
funding broader management of species and habitat acquisi­
tion.
Wildlife professionals generally agree that the ultimate 
goals for wildlife management are to promote diversity and 
balance among species. But they know that this can only be 
achieved by expensive, and often politically difficult habitat 
protection programs. Habitat loss is directly traceable to eco­
nomically productive development activities that destroy wild 
lands, lakes and streams and acquisition of new land or rights 
in land (for habitat) is costly.
Habitat cannot be adequately protected as long as it must 
be justified by a comparison of demonstrable economic bene­
fits and costs. Public revenues from wildlife enjoyment fall 
short of needs. Because hunting and fishing license fees are 
almost the exclusive source of state funding for wildlife man­
agement, programs concentrate on harvestable species and are 
generally inadequate for habitat protection activities. A l­
though burgeoning tourism and outdoor recreation enterprises 
have linked economic benefits to wildlife habitat, it is still 
impossible to provide an entirely economic justification for 
the kind and level of habitat and management protection that 
are needed. Relatively recent federal endangered species laws 
and comprehensive public land management provisions are 
important exceptions to the general focus on harvestable
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species. But even these programs are not yet fully integrated 
into the state systems of fish and wildlife management.
If wildlife protection law is to keep pace with technical 
and scientific understanding in the field it must account better 
for non-economic values. It must reflect an appreciation of the 
scientific, psychological, aesthetic and cultural importance of 
wildlife to society. Much of the nation's heritage is rooted in 
the satisfaction and enjoyment of maintaining rich wildlife 
resources. The public was belatedly aroused to support once- 
unpopular regulation of harvesting when commercial over-ex­
ploitation threatened the existence of this heritage. If the law 
is to evolve further the public must respond to a less graphic 
but even more pervasive threat: loss of wildlife heritage 
through decisions driven by economic balancing. Wildlife eco­
nomics is imprecise and insensitive to many significant val­
ues. The danger of ignoring deeply felt wildlife values will per­
petuate a system that resists sound technical advice as well as 
strong societal needs.
Economic development and expanding communities 
compete for wildlife habitat more intensely than ever. If the 
law hesitates to respond sufficiently until major problems are 
widespread and demonstrable, the harm may be irreversible in 
many parts of the country. The losses will be felt most acutely 
in a society where increasing technological complexity and 
population drive up not only the national economic wealth, 
but also the values produced by wildlife. Even the most abun­
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the environmental consequences of their actions and 
programs.
69. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-667d (1982). The Act requires that rec­
ommendations from wildlife agencies be made a part of 
any report submitted by the agency responsible for con­
struction.
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70. E.g,, Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke. 473 F.2d 
346 (8th Cir. 1972).
71. See  R. Liroff, A  National Policy for the Environment: 
NEPA and its Aftermath (1976); M. Bean, supra note 1 at 
195-202.
72. 30 U.S.C. § 1344 (1986 and Supp. 1988).
73. The Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, ch. 42 § 10, 30 Stat. 
1151 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 403 (1986)), requires a federal 
permit for bridges, dams, dikes, causeways and other 
structures, and the excavation or fill of any navigable wa­
ter. The express purpose was to protect the navigable ca­
pacity of United States waters. The Corps of Engineers, as 
the permitting authority under the Act, adopted regula­
tions requiring considerations of environmental factors 
in dredge and fill permit decisions. The regulations were 
upheld. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert, 
denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971). But the desirability of exercis­
ing more comprehensive regulatory authority led to the 
inclusion of § 404 in the Clean Water Act.
74. The 1972 Amendments to the Clean Water Act define 
"navigable waters" as "the waters of the United States." 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(7). This extended federal jurisdiction to the 
maximum extent permitted by the commerce clause of the 
Constitution. NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 
1975). Corps regulations extending to wetlands and adja­
cent areas (33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)) were applied in United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121 (1985). 
The agency determines what constitutes waters of the 
United States subject to regulation based on the nature of 
the prevailing soils, hydrology and vegetation. Avoyelles 
Sportsmen's League v. Marsh, 715 F. 2d 897 (5th Cir. 1983).
75. E.g., United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(placing fill in small inland lake).
Congress enacted exemptions to the § 404 permit re­
quirement for activities such as: "normal farming, silvi­
culture, and ranching activities," maintenance of existing 
structures, maintenance of farm and stock ponds, irriga­
tion ditches and drainage ditches, etc. These exemptions 
are narrowly construed. E.g., United States v. Akers,. 785 
F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1986) (exemptions do not extend to con­
struction of dike and drainage of area to be farmed).
76. 40 C.F.R § 230.10(a)(1987).
77. E.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 758 F.2d 508 
(lOth Cir. 1985) (otherwise nonfederal water project must 
satisfy requirements of Endangered Species Act); see 
supra note 61. In addition, states may veto a § 404 permit 
for noncompliance with state water quality standards
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and other substantial requirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1341; 
33 C.F.R. §§ 320.3(a), 325.2(b)(i).
78. Input from the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service comes in the 
form of a report recommending what action the Corps 
may take, see supra note 69, and biological assessments 
under Endangered Species Act, see supra note 61.
The Corps balances "|t]he benefits which reasonably 
may be expected to accrue from the proposal. . . against its 
reasonable foreseeable detriments." 33 C.F.R. § 
320.4(1987). In this process the Corps considers:
lajll factors which may be relevant to the 
proposal . . . including the cumulative effects 
thereof. Among those are conservation, eco­
nomics, aesthetics, general environmental con­
cerns, wetlands, cultural values, fish and 
wildlife values, flood hazards, floodplain val­
ues, land use, navigation, shore erosion and ac­
cretion, recreation, water supply and conserva­
tion, water quality, energy needs, safety, food 
and fiber production, mineral needs, considera­
tions of property ownership, and, in general, the 
needs and welfare of the people.
79. 30 U.S.C. § 1344(c)(1986). This authority has rarely been 
exercised. But see Bersani v. EPA, 674 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. 
N.Y. 1987) (denying a permit for a major shopping center 
that would involve filling wetlands).
